

CLARIFYING THE ROLE OF IMPLICIT BIAS IN EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE

Sponsored by the Department of History & Philosophy



**2021-2022
MA STUDENT SPEAKER**

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Abstract: I attempt to clarify the role of implicit bias in sustaining epistemic injustice and epistemologies of ignorance. Based on Fricker's (2007) characterization of epistemic injustice as harm towards others as knowers, it is clear implicit bias is not equivalent to but can certainly play a role in epistemic injustice, but how that unfolds concretely has not been drawn out. Accordingly, I identify six ways in which implicit bias can intervene on epistemic practices to sustain epistemic injustice. From delimiting our perceptual access, to affecting our memories and interpretive framework, implicit bias can play a major, pernicious role in epistemic practices and result in harms towards others as knowers. The way epistemic injustice can stem from implicit bias demonstrates a feedback loop existing between epistemic injustice, epistemologies of ignorance, and implicit bias. Because these are systemically intertwined, any strategy of addressing these injustices must target the system as a whole as targeting one piece and leaving the others unchecked will inevitably allow the targeting piece to be reproduced. Because of this, our strategy for ameliorating epistemic injustice and implicit bias must address social structures, not individual practices as a virtue theoretic strategy for amelioration would suggest.



WEDNESDAY, MARCH 16

5:00 – 6:30 pm ET

ZOOM LINK:

<https://emich.zoom.us/j/88637095228>

